Technical, Social & Legal Barriers to Effective Information Sharing Among Sensitive Organizations by Treglia, Joseph Vincent & Park, Joon S.
Technical, Social & Legal Barriers to Effective Information 
Sharing Among Sensitive Organizations
Joseph V. Treglia
School of Information Studies
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY, USA
jvtregli@syr.edu 
Joon S. Park
School of Information Studies
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY, USA
jspark@syr.edu 
ABSTRACT
While  millions  of  dollars  have  been  invested  in  information 
technologies to improve intelligence information sharing among 
law enforcement agencies at the Federal, Tribal, State and Local 
levels, there remains a hesitation to share information between 
agencies. This lack of coordination hinders the ability to prevent 
and  respond  to  crime  and  terrorism.  Work  to  date  has  not 
produced  solutions  nor  widely  accepted  paradigms  for 
understanding  the problem.  Therefore,  to  enhance  the current 
intelligence  information  sharing  services  between  government 
entities,  we  have  identified  three  major  problem  areas; 
Technical, Social, and Legal. Furthermore, we have developed a 
preliminary  model  and  theory  of  intelligence  information  
sharing through a literature review, experience and  interviews 
with  practitioners  in  the field.  This  model  and  theory  should 
serve  as  a  basic  conceptual  framework  for  further  academic 
work and  lead to further investigation  and clarification  of  the 
identified  factors  and  the degree of  impact  they  exert  on  the 
system  so  that  actionable  solutions  can  be  identified  and 
implemented.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computers and Society] Public Policy Issues – Use. 
K.4.3 Organizational Impacts - Computer-supported  
collaborative work.
K.5.2 [Legal Aspects of Computing] – Governmental Issues – 
Regulation. 
K.6.1 [Management of Computing and Information 
Systems] Project and People Management – Strategic  
Information Systems Planning. 
K.6.4 System Management – Centralization/decentralization.
Keywords
Information  sharing,  collaboration,  intelligence  information, 
trust.
1. PROBLEMS AND MODEL
While  millions  of  dollars  have  been  invested  in  information 
technologies to improve information sharing capabilities among 
all law enforcement agencies, according to the National Security 
Agency  there  remains  a  hesitation  to  share  intelligence 
information between agencies  (Lieberman,  2007).  This project 
aimed to identify barriers affecting effective information sharing 
between federal, tribal, state and local law enforcement agencies 
in the United States. Research in understanding these dynamics 
will  lead  to  identification  of  actionable  solutions  to  law 
enforcement intelligence information sharing across the federal, 
tribal, state and local levels. 
To enhance the current intelligence information sharing services 
between  government  entities,  we  have  identified  three  major 
problem areas;  Technical,  Social,  and  Legal.  Furthermore,  we 
have developed a preliminary model and theory of intelligence  
information sharing through a literature review, experience and 
interviews with practitioners in the field.  Within each problem 
area we identified, individual factors were found that influence 
whether  or  not  intelligence  information  is  ultimately  shared. 
Technical factors  include  interoperability,  availability,  and 
control  issues.  Social factors  involve trust,  shadow  networks, 
and  criticality  issues.  Finally,  Legal factors  are  defined  by 
considering local, state, and federal policies and their conflict. 
Figure 1: Intelligence Information Sharing Factors
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2. FRAMEWORK AND THEORY
Within  this  framework  we  describe  two  types  of  influences 
affecting  whether  or  not  sharing  occurs;  facilitators and 
detractors. This  model  is  an  offspring  of  Lewin’s  force field 
analysis  which  is  used  here  as  a  framework  for  looking  at 
factors or  forces influencing  the decision  of  an  individual  or 
organization to share intelligence information (Thomas,  1985). 
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Forces act as facilitators, driving movement toward information 
sharing, or detractors drawing momentum away from a choice 
to share intelligence information.  Each of the factors under the 
headings given has a potential for facilitating or detracting from 
a choice to share intelligence information in a given context.
Facilitators  include  the  positive  influences  that  result  from 
technical,  social  and  legal  rules,  regulations,  actions  or 
perceptions. 
Technical issues such as having compatible operating systems, 
software, hardware, data definitions, secure access, control, high 
usability,  system availability  all  can  work towards  improving 
the  potential  for  information  sharing  but  do  not  cause 
information  to  be  shared  (Lee  &  Rao,  2007;  Scott,  2006). 
Regarding technology we may picture two young friends who 
tie two tin cans together on a string to communicate; it is not the 
technology  of  the cans  that  cause  the two to  talk  across  the 
string but their desire to share with each other that controls use 
of technology.  It is therefore the social and cultural aspects of 
the  relationship  that  matter  more  than  the  technology  in  the 
equation for information sharing. Today, the two kids from our 
example are texting.
Socially,  greater  trust  and  knowledge  of  the  other  parties 
involved  lead  to  greater  tendency  towards  intelligence 
information sharing. This involves agency culture and personal 
ties or connections with other involved agencies; which include 
shadow networking ties outside the workplace to include family 
and friend or other associations that involve one member having 
some other contact or relationship with someone associated with 
another agency (Drake, Steckler, & Koch, 2004b; “Information 
Sharing  in  and  Across  Government  Agencies:  The  Role  and 
Influence of Scientist, Politician, and Bureaucrat Subcultures -- 
Drake et al.  22 (1):  67 --  Social  Science Computer Review,” 
n.d.; Marks & Sun, 2007). A ready example is family, friends or 
participation  in  clubs  or  activities  which  involve others  apart 
from the work environment. These external contacts can have a 
positive influence on the likelihood of intelligence information 
sharing.  Shared training and joint  operations such as  the U.S. 
Marshals  joint  fugitive  round  up  effort  with  state  and  local 
agencies  in Florida  can  have a positive effect  on information 
sharing (Clark, 2008). Importance, as described previously, can 
be a very critical  factor influencing the sharing of intelligence 
information as well. Information that is credible and which may 
result in some specific harm or loss is more readily shared and 
the pressure to share this information increased where there may 
be an approaching deadline (Lee & Rao, 2007).  
In  the  area  of  legal influence,  having  a  clear  and  enforced 
agency  policy  regarding  intelligence  information  sharing  will 
lead to the greater likelihood that information will be shared as 
will increased knowledge of laws and regulations which allow 
for  intelligence  information  sharing.  System  governance  and 
participation  by  others  is  also  expected  to  be  facilitator  of 
intelligence  information  sharing  where  members  and 
organizations have positive regard for and accept each other’s 
roles  (Cresswell,  Pardo,  &  Hassan,  2007).  People  within 
agencies are more likely to participate in systems that they have 
choice, investment and control over.
Detractors include negative influences resulting from technical, 
social and legal rules, regulations, actions or perceptions.
Intelligence comes from the field or other sources to an agency 
and  the identified  factors  may  negatively  affect  the degree to 
which this information is likely to be shared (Carter & United 
States,  2004).  Legal  factors  with a  negative influence  include 
security clearances which are not uniform or recognized across 
agencies,  laws  regarding  privacy,  secrecy  or  sharing  of 
information  that  are  conflicting  or  not  well  understood  by 
participants.  Social  issues here involve issues of lack of trust, 
integrity,  assurance  or  an  agency  culture  which  is  geared 
towards not sharing (Lee & Rao, 2007). Trust is reduced where 
agencies  compete  for  statistics,  media  attention  and  funding. 
Informal or outside contacts which are described as part of the 
shadow  network  have  great  potential  to  provide  a  negative 
influence if the information may be potentially damaging to an 
entity or person.  Criticality includes timing of information and 
its potential impact so where there is little urgency the pressure 
to share this intelligence is reduced. Where there is no identified 
time frame or deadline the information may not be reacted to in 
a  timely  manner  thus  reducing  the  pressure  to  share  this 
information. Lack of knowledge or inaccurate knowledge about 
what actions can be taken regarding sharing of information can 
hinder  information  sharing.  Matters  of  jurisdiction,  authority, 
and  governance  or  control  over  the power or  influence  work 
against sharing (Drake, Steckler, & Koch, 2004a). 
Technical factors act as detractors as well. Many agencies use 
different  hardware and  software programs  for  communication 
and  information  management  and  these  may  not  interact 
together.  Systems  which  are  not  responsive  or  show  poor 
performance  may  not  be  adopted.  Agencies  with  existing 
systems  may  not  be  financially  able  to  change  to  more 
compatible  or  standardized  systems.  The  costs  for  retraining 
onto new services can be high as well. Costs for maintenance of 
the systems must be considered.
These  factors  serve  as  the  basis  and  framework  for 
investigation.  Inter-relationships  of  the  identified  factors 
influence the degree to which  information  sharing  is more or 
less  likely to occur  and  can  be viewed as  the balance  of  the 
result (see Figure 2 below).
 Figure 2: Factors influencing the sharing of intelligence 
information
We  are  developing  a  formula  and  model  based  on  this 
framework  to  describe  and  to  predict  resulting  conditions 
regarding information sharing behaviors based on knowledge of 
the  influencing  factors.  Probable  effects  from  modifying  the 
influencing  factors  are  more  readily  apparent  and  easier  to 
identify using such a model. The further investigation of these 
influences will inform the model as to the degree of influence 
each may have relative to the other so that decision makers can 
pattern solutions towards desired ends.
3. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
By using the model developed we can visualize the effects of 
making  changes  in different  areas  and  observe the outcomes. 
We  can  see  how  adjustments  in  degree of  influence  for  the 
influencing  factors  identified  determine  whether  or  not 
intelligence  information  is  shared  under  the  given 
circumstances.  This  leads  to  the  theory  that  intelligence 
information  sharing  between  law  enforcement  agencies  is 
affected  by  technical,  social  and  legal  factors  which  are 
comprised  of  issues  of  interoperability,  availability,  control, 
trust, shadow networks, criticality, knowledge, and governance. 
We have identified the major problem areas and posit that these 
factors  work  to  facilitate  or  detract  from  the  sharing  of 
intelligence information between agencies.
This  model  and  theory  should  serve  as  a  basic  conceptual 
framework  for  further  academic  work  and  lead  to  further 
investigation and clarification of the identified factors and the 
degree of  impact  they exert  on  the system so  that  actionable 
solutions can be identified and implemented.
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